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Abstract: Recent debate has centered around the contemporary relevance and even the original validity 
of F. A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom. Was that book directed against command socialism only or against 
welfare-state interventionism as well? In either case, should the book even be read anymore? This 
essay takes a step back from the dichotomy between socialism and interventionism and explores two 
specific ideas of Hayek's which deserve renewed attention: first, his claim that economic liberty is the 
fundamental liberty and that political liberty is merely secondary in value. Second, Hayek's conception 
of the rule-of-law, which has implications for contemporary command-and-control regulation. 
Furthermore, that Hayek's normative defense of the rule-of-law in the Road to Serfdom is related to his 
positive theory of prices and economic calculation in “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” While 
Hayek's specific target in the Road to Serfdom was command socialism, his book embodied arguments 
which are more widely applicable and relevant today.
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In a series of recent essays, Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail have questioned the value of 
F. A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]).1 Farrant and McPhail dispute Caldwell's (2007:30f), 
claim that Hayek's Road to Serfdom was directed solely against full-blown command planning and 
socialism.2 Instead, Farrant and McPhail say, Hayek himself claimed, in subsequent writings, that his 
arguments in the Road to Serfdom applied to the contemporary welfare state or mixed economy as well. 
Because the welfare state has obviously not resulted in Soviet- or Nazi-style totalitarianism, Farrant 
and McPhail say, Hayek's arguments must be mistaken. Similarly, Farrant and McPhail also reject the 
claim (Caldwell 2011, Boettke and Snow 2012) that Road to Serfdom's criticism of central planning 
must be distinguished from Hayek's milder criticism of the welfare state in The Constitution of Liberty 
(2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1973a, 1976a, 1979). Caldwell (2011, 1997:1866-
1871) and Boettke and Snow (2012) argue that Road to Serfdom must be understood in its specific 
historical and institutional context – that it must not be confused with Hayek's later works, which are 
more relevant to the political situation today. Farrant and McPhail claim that Hayek himself considered 
all his works to relate to a single, ongoing theme, and that in Hayek's view, the same arguments apply 
against both command planning and the welfare state or mixed economy. Furthermore, they say, even if 
Caldwell is correct that Road to Serfdom was directed solely against command planning, this would 
render Road to Serfdom irrelevant to contemporary political issues. According to Farrant and McPhail, 
one cannot simultaneously argue – as Caldwell does – that Road to Serfdom was written about an 
obsolete, defunct form of socialism and yet that the book is also contemporarily relevant. In response, 
Boettke and Snow (2012) have argued that Farrant and McPhail misunderstand and under-appreciate 
Hayek's arguments.3
This essay will contribute to the defense of Hayek by Caldwell (2007, 2011), Boettke (1995), 
and Boettke and Snow (2012). Rather than replying point-by-point to Farrant and McPhail, instead, I 
will elaborate on two specific features of Hayek's works which I believe have been under-appreciated 
or misunderstood. Thus, I will implicitly respond to Farrant and McPhail's claim that Road to Serfdom 
is irrelevant by highlighting features which I believe deserve renewed attention. I will point out only 
some of the broader implications, for my purpose is to be suggestive, not comprehensive. I do not aim 
to refute every single remark by Farrant and McPhail nor definitively defend Hayek, but instead, I hope 
to move the discussion of Hayek to another plane to facilitate constructive debate. Throughout this 
essay, I will be making constant reference to Hayek's other books and essays on political philosophy, 
for they constitute the continuation and culmination of the research program which Hayek began in the 
Road to Serfdom. Thus, I claim that while Road to Serfdom was indeed written about command 
planning (Caldwell 2007:30f., 2011; Boettke and Snow 2012; Godard 2013), it embodies novel claim 
about economics and politics which are more broadly relevant (cf. Boettk 1995). In his later writings, 
Hayek himself adapted his own arguments against command planning in Road to Serfdom and applied 
them to the contemporary mixed economy. Indeed, in postwar Germany, the Road to Serfdom was 
received, not as a conservative reaction against socialism, but as progressive and revolutionary 
advocacy for free-markets (Godard 2013). I hope to rehabilitate this German version of his legacy.
Section I demonstrates that according to Hayek, economic liberty is the fundamental liberty – 
that political liberty and democratic representation are merely secondary in value. In section II, I argue 
that Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law in the Road to Serfdom has important implications for the 
contemporary regulatory state because command-and-control regulation is a “light” form of command 
socialism. Furthermore, I argue that Hayek's normative defense of the rule-of-law is related to his 
positive economic views on economic calculation and the price-system. 
I. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
One of Hayek's central claims in Road to Serfdom is that all planning and economic 
intervention is necessarily coercive: it is impossible to interfere in the economy without interfering in 
individual people's lives. Boettke (1995:11) takes brief notice of this feature but he does not explore it 
in any great detail, merely quoting one statement by Hayek without offering any commentary or 
explanation. Lawson and Clark (2010), in an empirical examination of the Hayek-Friedman claim that 
political freedom cannot endure without prior economic freedom, do not mention the importance 
Hayek placed on economic freedom for its own sake. In fact, they appear to imply that Hayek ranked 
political freedom particularly highly (Lawson and Clark 2010:231):
Hayek, writing immediately after World War II, appeared more concerned with the 
trappings of traditional political democracy: freedom to vote, run for office, organize 
political parties, etc. Friedman, writing in the early 1960s, appears equally concerned 
with a broader array of civil liberties and, indeed, often downplays the role of formal 
political rights like voting (e.g., in Hong Kong). 
But in fact, Hayek – like Friedman – discounted the value of formal political rights, 
emphasizing instead the importance of economic rights. According to Hayek, economic planning and 
intervention entail making people's decisions for them. Crucially, this is true of both full-blown 
command planning as well as piecemeal intervention (Huerta de Soto 2010:83-87). As Hayek notes, 
many of the planners have failed to realize these facts. “The consolation our planners offer us is that 
this authoritarian direction will apply 'only' to economic matters” (2007 [1944]:124). But this reply is 
based on “the erroneous belief that there are purely economic ends separate from the other ends of life” 
(Hayek 2007 [1944]:125). Economics is simply choosing those means which are best at accomplishing 
given ends. Hayek thus agreed with Mises (1981 [1922]:107) that in this sense, every aspect of life is 
economic. For example, it is impossible to learn and obtain knowledge without access to physical 
books or classrooms. For government to plan the production of books and classrooms is to plan the 
terms and conditions on which people will be able to obtain knowledge. Or as Milton Friedman 
famously pointed out (1962:16-18), freedom of speech cannot be maintained when the government 
owns all the printing presses (cf. Hayek 1973c:149, Rothbard 1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:538). 
Therefore, Hayek (2007 [1944]:126) states, economic planning raises the question of “whether it shall 
be we who decide what is more, and what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by 
the planners.” “The authority directing all economic activity . . . would control the allocation of the 
limited means for all our ends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:126). “Economic control is not merely control of a 
sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our 
ends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:127, quoted in Boettke 1995:11).
Similarly, when Marx said that “in place of the government over persons comes the 
administration of things,” Mises (1981 [1922]:73) replied, “there can be no administration of goods 
which is not administration of men – i.e. the bending of one human will to another – and no direction of 
productive processes which is not the government over persons – i.e. domination of one human will by 
another.” Furthermore, Mises said (1981 [1922]:493),
Whatever people do in the market economy, is the execution of their own plans. In this 
sense every human action means planning. What those calling themselves planners 
advocate is not the substitution of planned action for letting things go. It is the 
substitution of the planner's own plan for the plans of his fellow men.
This passage by Mises is reminiscent of something Hayek often said, viz. that the question is not 
planning versus no planning, but rather, the question is, who plans? Are individuals permitted to plan 
their own lives, or will the government plan their lives for them? Hayek summarized his argument by 
prefacing his chapter (“Economic Control and Totalitarianism” in the Road to Serfdom) with this 
quotation from Hilaire Belloc: “The control of the production of wealth is the control of human life 
itself” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:124).
It may be difficult for some philosophers to understand why economic liberty is so important 
for its own sake according to Mises and Hayek. As Brennan (2014:80) notes, “Some philosophers – 
themselves never having owned a business – might have a hard time understanding these kinds of 
desires.” In response, Brennan (2014:78) explains that people “have ideas and visions that they want to 
implement. Pursuing projects over the long term is often part (if not the only part) of what gives 
coherence and meaning to their lives.” Pursuing these projects requires physical means, and so “They 
also want to be able to use, give-away, sell, and in some cases, destroy these objects, as part of their 
pursuit of their visions of the good life” (Brennan 2014:79f.). Many philosophers believe that the 
fundamental human liberties are precisely those which a philosopher uses in his daily life to pursue his 
scholarly studies, such as the freedom of speech. They cannot understand why the freedom to own 
private property is so important. Brennan (2014:80) continues, “But if that philosopher can understand 
why one might want to write a book by oneself, rather than with co-authors or by a committee, the 
philosopher can similarly understand why someone might want to own a factory or a farm or a store.” 
It is private property which allows us to pursue our dreams, express ourselves, and achieve self-
actualization. Citing John Tomasi, Brennan (2014:92) continues, “people have an interest in being 'self-
authors,' that is, in choosing a conception of the good life and finding the means to achieve that 
conception.” Like Brennan, Mises and Hayek argue that economic liberty is essential because it implies 
the individual's freedom of access to the means for accomplishing his ends.
There is a second reason why the fundamental liberties ultimately reduce to economic liberties. 
All economic phenomena are interrelated, and any intervention in one area of the economy produces 
unintended consequences elsewhere. Mises (1996 [1929], 1998, 1974 [1950]) had famously argued that 
price-controls especially tend to produce this dynamic of interventionism. Price floors and ceilings lead 
to unintended and undesired shortages and surpluses, in turn motivating additional interventions to fix 
those problems caused by price-controls. According to Mises, one price-control leads to another until 
every price in the entire economy is controlled or supplanted by command-and-control, resulting in de 
facto socialism (cf. Mises 1974 [1950]). More generally, we can state that any intervention – not only 
price-controls – will lead to unintended consequences which often motivate additional interventions.4 
Hayek noted this in the Road to Serfdom, saying (2007 [1944]:137), “the close interdependence of all 
economic phenoma makes it difficult to stop planning just where we wish and that, once the free 
working of the market is impeded beyond a certain degree, the planner will be forced to extend his 
controls until they become all-comprehensive.”5 Hayek criticized J. S. “Mill's Muddle,” the mistaken 
notion that production and distribution could be disconnected from one another (Ebeling 1977:11, 
Hayek 1967c:91f.). The same market prices which distribute the product also incentivize its 
maximization. Therefore, interference with prices and market-based distribution will alter production 
as well, resulting in the production of a different amount – usually smaller – of different – usually 
inferior – goods.
Thus, while different interventions will have different consequences, the fundamental fact is – 
according to Hayek – that all interventions negate individual freedom to one degree or another. Price-
controls, command-and-control regulation, and discriminatory taxation all deny freedom more than 
simple redistribution of wealth and neutral taxation, because they interfere more with the autonomy of 
individual decision-making and planning (cf. Ikeda 2015:409, 414). But above all, every government 
intervention entails making people's decisions for them – planning their lives in their steads. Moreover, 
one intervention tends to beget another due to the law of unintended consequences.
Hayek's argument is not merely that certain kinds of intervention tend to produce political side-
effects which eventually lead to the non-democratic aspects totalitarianism – although Hayek certainly 
does believe this. Lawson and Clark (2010:231) say Hayek “appear[s] to adhere to a proto-public 
choice argument that 'power corrupts.'” Indeed, the famous quotation by Acton introduces Hayek's 
chapter on “Why the Worst Get on Top” (2007 [1944]:157).6 But this is not the central argument of 
Hayek's book. Instead, and more importantly, Hayek argues that every economic intervention itself 
inherently and directly compromises freedom. It is not merely that democratic elections cannot be 
sustained after a long train of economic interventions – although Hayek does claim this – but rather, 
Hayek says, individual liberty is undermined by the economic interventions themselves. It is 
fundamentally mistaken to believe that Hayek criticizes economic interventions primarily because they 
tend to eventually compromise democracy and suffrage. Rather, Hayek argues that economic liberty is 
the fundamental liberty, and political liberty is valuable only insofar as it helps guarantee economic 
liberty.
Consider what Hayek says about democracy in The Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]: 110f.), 
Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace 
and individual freedom. As such it is by no means infallible or certain. . . . [There is] the 
misleading and unfounded belief that, so long as the ultimate source of power is the will 
of the majority, the power cannot be arbitrary. . . . If democracy resolves on a task which 
necessarily involves the use of power which cannot be guided by fixed rules, it must 
become an arbitrary power.
For Hayek, democracy and suffrage have merely instrumental value. The fundamental desideratum is 
economic liberty. Democratic participation in the political process is not valuable for its own sake, but 
only insofar as it restricts the scope of government power and reduces the extent of political 
intervention in the economy. According to Hayek, democracy is merely a means, not an end. The 
primary goal is limitation of government to preserve economic liberty. Thus, in The Constitution of 
Liberty, he added (2011 [1960]:167), “Liberalism is a doctrine about what the law ought to be, 
democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be the law. . . . [Liberalism] accepts 
majority rule as a method of deciding, but not as an authority for what the decision ought to be.” 
Democracy may be a valid and important means of limiting political power, but ultimately, political 
decisions are to be guided by the fundamental principle that economic liberty is sacrosanct.
This explains why, in an encyclopedia article on the liberal philosophy, in the section on 
democracy (1973c:142-144), Hayek devoted three paragraphs to discussing how limitation of power 
takes precedence over democracy, and only one paragraph to how democracy itself cannot survive – 
giving way to authoritarianism – when political power is not limited. The latter claim is often 
considered the heart of Road to Serfdom, but Hayek clearly believed this claim was of merely 
secondary importance. Furthermore, Hayek famously declared (1976b:154),
I must confess to preferring non-democratic government under the law to unlimited (and 
therefore essentially lawless) democratic government. Government under the law seems 
to me to be the higher value, which it was once hoped that democratic watch-dogs 
would preserve.
For Hayek, the truly important thing is that the government's activities be restricted by the rule-of-law 
in order to ensure economic liberty. Political liberty – meaning democracy and widespread suffrage – 
are valuable only insofar as they help guarantee economic liberty. Hayek lamented the fact that 
democratic suffrage was confused with limitation of government. In his words, (1976b:153; cf. Hayek 
1979:3),7
Thus arose unlimited democracy . . . [from the belief] that the control of government by 
elected representatives of the majority made any other checks on the powers of 
government unnecessary, so that all the various constitutional safeguards which had 
been developed in the course of time could be dispensed with.
Thus, it is profound misinterpretation of Hayek to claim that he criticizes economic 
interventions merely because they tend to eventually require the abandonment of democracy. Such an 
interpretation assumes Hayek valued democracy per se more than he actually did. Nor was Hayek 
alone in discounting the value of democracy, for others as well have argued that limitation of political 
power is more important than democratic representation. For example, in a textbook on basic political 
theory, Hague and Harrop (2007: 49) write,
[L]iberal democracy is a compromise. Specifically, it seeks to integrate the authority of 
democratic governments with simultaneous limits on their scope. By definition, liberal 
democracy is limited government. ... Elected rulers are subject to constitutions that 
usually include a statement of individual rights. ... In these respects, a liberal democracy 
is democracy disarmed.
Hague and Harrop argue that liberal democracy is liberal precisely because it is not fully democratic. 
Indeed, Hague and Harrop (2007: 49) say, the United States is “the most liberal (and perhaps the least 
democratic) of all the liberal democracies.” Liberal democracy, according to Hague and Harrop, 
implies that certain areas of life are excluded from democratic decision-making. This is in line with 
what was said by Hayek's fellow ordo-liberal (Kolev 2010), Wilhelm Röpke (1998 [1957]:69):
Democracy is, in the long run, compatible with freedom only on condition that all, or at 
least most, voters are agreed that certain supreme norms and principles of public life and 
economic order must remain outside the sphere of democratic decisions.
Furthermore, according to Hayek (1973b:108), this tension between limited government and 
democracy goes back to the founding of the liberal philosophy, which already placed precedence for 
the one over the other:
For Locke, and for the later theorists of Whiggism and the separation of powers, it was 
not so much the source from which the laws originated as their character of general rules 
of just conduct equally applicable to all which justified their coercive application.
Edward S. Corwin (1955: 4), discussing the foundational philosophy of America agrees, saying:
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground solely of its rootage in 
popular will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth of American 
constitutional theory. Earlier the supremacy accorded to constitutions was ascribed less 
to their putative source than to their supposed content, to their embodiment of an 
essential and unchanging justice. . . . There are, it is predicated, certain principles of 
right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, all 
together regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the 
community. 
What Hayek argued was that human freedom and liberty require that a private sphere be carved 
out in which individuals may act for themselves and plan their own lives, safe from government 
interference. Political liberty, according to Hayek, exists insofar as the political system successfully 
safeguards economic liberty. On the one hand, political liberty entails a government which promotes 
economic liberty by preventing such private crimes as murder, theft, and fraud as well as by enforcing 
contracts. But at the same time, political liberty implies protection against incursions by the 
government itself, such as illegitimate or excessive taxation and regulation. Thus, political liberty 
necessarily entails limitation of government but it does not necessarily imply democracy. Democracy is 
valuable only as a means to the higher end of limiting government. Sometimes, the limitation of 
political power actually requires the limitation of democracy.
But this aspect of Hayek's thought has been neglected. As we have noted, Lawson and Clark 
(2010:231) argue that compared to Friedman, Hayek places a high value on formal political rights. In 
reality, Hayek is less concerned with the political side-effects of reductions of economic liberty. 
Instead, he is more concerned with the loss of economic liberty itself. The chief problem is not abuse of 
political power or suspension of democracy and suffrage – although Hayek is certainly concerned with 
these things. Instead, Hayek believed, economic liberty is itself the fundamental value, and any 
political side-effects are of secondary concern. Neither do Farrant and McPhail, in their several essays, 
offer any significant discussion of this aspect of Hayek's thought.
This misunderstanding of Hayek is evident in E. F. M. Durbin (1945)'s response to Hayek's 
Road to Serfdom as well. According to Durbin (1945:360), Hayek wrongly assumed that “planning” 
means comprehensive planning, specifying the precise quantities and destinations of every nut and bolt. 
But in fact, Durbin (1945:360) says, “planning” in the popular sense means only “a principle of 
administration and not an inflexible budget of production.” According to Durbin (1945:361),
The final responsibility for taking economic decisions is transferred from the private 
company or group of shareholders to the representatives of the community sitting upon 
the Board of a Public Corporation – who are, in their turn, answerable to some Supreme 
Economic Authority dependent on a Parliament freely elected by the people.
But Durbin does not answer the question which Hayek would have considered fundamental: will these 
public officials make the same decisions as private market actors would have, or not? (cf. Leoni 2009 
[1965]:67). If the political decisions differ from the private ones, then economic liberty has been 
compromised. Durbin believes he can refute Hayek by distinguishing between comprehensive planning 
and piecemeal intervention and regulation. But Hayek's argument was that any form of planning or 
intervention is objectionable simply because political decision-making displaces private decision-
making. The more government plans, the less individuals can. Durbin claims it sufficient that the 
political authority will be democratically elected, but Hayek already argued this is irrelevant. The 
question is not whether the political officials are democratically elected or not, but whether they deny 
individuals the ability to make private economic decisions for themselves. Durbin pleads that Road to 
Serfdom's criticism of comprehensive central-planning is misplaced because "[b]y 'economic planning,' 
I repeat, we mean a change in the direction of responsibility” (Durbin 1945:362). But it is precisely this 
“change in the direction of responsibility” which Hayek objected to. Durbin continues (1945:364) that, 
“We are politically free because we share in forming the laws, not because we can do what we like.” 
But for Hayek, it is precisely when “we can do what we like” that we are free. Our “share in forming 
the laws” is valuable only insofar as it helps ensure that “we can do what we like.” For Durbin, 
economic liberty is merely secondary in value, and it is democratic suffrage which takes precedence, 
whereas the exact opposite is true for Hayek. According to Durbin's logic, we could be politically free 
if we shared in forming the laws which enslaved us, even if we couldn't do what we like. Hayek might 
have responded that freedom means more than electing one's slavemaster.
Durbin does not merely disagree with Hayek, but rather, he fundamentally misunderstands his 
point. According to Durbin (1945:368), Hayek's argument on the relationship between economic and 
political liberty is “historical,” based merely on the fact that historically, economic and political liberty 
have been expanded simultaneously. Therefore, Durbin (1945:368) says, Hayek's argument is “a plain 
case of post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” But this is not at all what Hayek means. Hayek's claim is not that 
historically, economic and political liberty have grown up together. Instead, Hayek's claim is that 
economic liberty alone is the true, fundamental form of liberty. His argument is not historical, but 
logical and philosophical. According to Hayek, economic liberty takes precedence over political liberty 
simply because economic liberty is more important. The individual's freedom to plan his own private 
economic decisions is more valuable than his ability to vote. In fact, the purpose of voting is merely to 
help the individual protect his own private economic autonomy.
For another example, consider David Schweickart's (1992:19, 22) proposal for an economic 
democracy to centrally direct investment.8 Schweickart claims that this would avoid the totalitarian 
problem of comprehensive economic planning. But to control investment is to control everything. As 
Hayek said, “The basic decision must be at the center so long as the allocation of capital comes from 
the center. If nobody except for the government is allowed to own capital it is the government which 
decides all of the ultimate questions” (Ebeling 1977:11). Schweickart believes that as long as the 
government does not engage in Stalinist comprehensive planning, liberty is safe. But Hayek responds 
that the key is that whenever government – no matter how democratic – makes any decision at all, it 
threatens the abilities of individuals to privately make economic decisions in their own lives. Hence, 
the distinction between command planning and mere intervention evades the fundamental issue, viz.: 
that regardless of the specific political structure of decision-making, every political intervention denies 
the abilities of individual people to make private economic decisions (Huerta de Soto 2010:83-87). 
This is true even though not all interventions do so in the same way or to the same degree. Hayek 
would not have claimed that Schweickart's economic democracy would have necessarily led to gulags 
and concentration camps. Instead, Hayek would have simply replied that if government decides 
investment, then private individuals do not. Every additional decision made by government means one 
less economic decision made by a private individual in his own personal life. Or as Milton Friedman 
famously demonstrated, government fiscal policy crowds out private investment.
These two examples – Durbin and Schweickart – help us to reevaluate one of Farrant and 
McPhail's claims against Hayek. They (F&M 2011a:102 / M&F 2013:969, 2012:424) quote Toye's 
statement that “Attlee government’s policy in the 1940’s was merely interventionism under the barest 
veneer of planning.” Like Durbin, Farrant and McPhail believe the distinction between intervention and 
comprehensive planning is crucial, and that Hayek's arguments in the Road to Serfdom are relevant 
only to comprehensive planning but fail to make any mark against mere intervention. According to both 
Durbin as well as Farrant and McPhail, Hayek's criticism of command planning was therefore 
irrelevant to contemporary interventionist Britain. But the question is, will political officials do the 
same things as the capitalist executives would have, or not? Will political interventions override 
individual decision-making, or not? If political officials make the same decisions as the capitalist 
executives would have, then they are superfluous. But if they make different decisions, then they 
override consumer sovereignty and violate economic liberty. Either the government's arbitrary 
regulations, price-controls, and interventions overrule the market or they do not (cf. Leoni 2009 
[1965]:67). As the socialist Maurice Dobb said “Either planning means overriding the autonomy of 
separate decisions, or it apparently means nothing at all” (quoted in Hoff 1981:267 and Huerta de Soto 
2010:267n41; cf. Hayek 1948:158).9 Therefore, Hayek claimed, if our goal is to maximize individual 
freedom, all forms of intervention are suspect – including social democracy, democratic socialism, 
market socialism, and economic democracy (cf. Huerta de Soto 2010:83-87). 
Obviously, to explain Hayek is not necessarily to justify him, and some may still disagree with 
him. Perhaps some will insist that democratic suffrage really is more important than one's ability to 
make private economic decisions. But before one can criticize Hayek, one must understand him. So far, 
the debates over Hayek's legacy have failed to appreciate Hayek's fundamental belief that regulations 
and economic interventions are inherently objectionable, not merely because they produce undesirably 
political side-effects – although they do – but primarily because economic liberty is the fundamental 
liberty. According to Hayek, economic liberty is valuable for its own sake, and political liberty 
possesses merely an instrumental value. Democracy and suffrage are desirable, according to Hayek, 
only insofar as they assist in limiting political power and the extent of political intervention in the 
economy. Perhaps future debates over Hayek's legacy will be more fruitful if they explicitly take these 
facts into account.
II. THE RULE-OF-LAW
The second idea of Hayek's which deserves renewed attention is his conception of the rule-of-
law. In his 1956 preface to the Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]:45), Hayek referred to this chapter (2007 
[1944]:112-123) as the central chapter of the book. According to Hayek, the rule-of-law entails general, 
purpose-independent laws which apply to everyone equally. Being purpose-independent, these laws 
cannot single out specific individuals, nor can they specify the activities which individuals ought 
engage in. These are general rules of just conduct equally applicable to all, laying down a framework 
within which individuals are free to make decisions for themselves. Like the rules of sports, legitimate 
law must establish only the rules of game but refrain from commanding economic actors how to play 
the game. Or to take Hayek's own example, the rules of the road constrain the manner in which one 
must drive but do not specify any specific destination (Hayek 2007 [1944]:113). Individuals must be 
free to make decisions for themselves within the framework of the general, non-discriminatory rule-of-
law.10 Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law may be understood as providing the legal framework for 
limiting government in order to protect the economic liberty of individuals to make decisions for 
themselves.
According to Hayek, laws must be publicized, well-known, and impartially enforced. Moreover, 
there must be minimal opportunity for discretionary and arbitrary treatment by public officials. But this 
is far from sufficient, and not all publicized, impartially-enforced laws satisfy the rule-of-law. If the 
rule-of-law were merely formal or procedural, then unjust, immoral laws could easily satisfy the rule-
of-law. For example, the government could order the death penalty for all members of a certain 
religious group. As long this death penalty is enshrined in publicized written law and impartially 
enforced against all members of this religious group, then it satisfies the procedural rule-of-law. But the 
rule-of-law has a substantive component as well: not only must the law be well-known and impartially 
enforced, but it must be general and purpose-independent. Individuals must remain free to make 
decisions for themselves in their own lives. In “Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” an essay 
summarizing his political philosophy, Hayek distinguished between the formal and substantive aspects 
of the rule-of-law, saying (1966:165),
The 'rule of law' corresponds here to what in German is called materieller Rechtsstaat 
[material rule of law] as distinguished from the mere formelle Rechtsstaat [formal rule 
of law] which requires only that each act of government is authorized by legislation, 
whether such a law consists of a general rule of just conduct or not.
The concept of a substantive rule-of-law has fallen into disrepute, and the rule-of-law has come 
to be associated with only its formal or procedural aspects. But this is merely a recent development. 
According to Hayek (1966:169f.), 
the term 'law' itself, which in the older conception of the 'rule of law' had meant only 
rules of conduct equally applicable to all, came to mean any rule of organization or even 
any particular command, approved by the constitutionally appointed legislature. Such a 
conception of the rule of law which merely demands that a command be legitimately 
issued and not that it be a rule of justice equally applicable to all (what the Germans call 
the merely formelle Rechsstaat), of course no longer provides any protection of 
individual freedom.
As David Bernstein (2011:9) similarly notes, 
the idea that the guarantee of 'due process of law' regulates the substance of legislation 
as well as judicial procedure arose from the long-standing Anglo-American principle 
that the government has inherently limited powers and the individual citizen has 
inherent rights. . . .[C]ertain types of acts passed by legislatures could not be valid 
legislation, which naturally led to the conclusion that enforcing them could not be due 
process of law.
Bernstein italicizes “of law” in the original to emphasize the following (Bernstein 2012): 
[my critic] avers that “due process” quite clearly refers only to “a guarantee of 
procedural fairness,” i.e., “notice and a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.” But in 
fact, this is not clear at all. The mistake [my critic] is making is to separate “due 
process” from “of law.” We live in a positivist age, where valid “law” is simply 
whatever the legislature passes and the governor signs. But the Fourteenth Amendment 
was not passed in such an age, but at a time when legislation that involved an arbitrary 
and capricious deprivation of people's rights was not considered to be proper “law” at 
all.
Or as Aquinas said, an unjust law is no law at all. 
According to Hayek, the substantive conception of the rule-of-law has declined because of the 
twin influence of unlimited democracy and legal positivism (1967b:98). The law is whatever the people 
or their representatives have legislated, regardless of the content of that legislation. Furthermore, the 
separation of powers has failed, Hayek says, because law (private law) has been confused with 
government (public law) (1976b:153f.; 1973b:112; 1967b:98, 101, 1967c:93ff., 1966:169; cf. McIlwain 
1947).11 
Private law means general rules of just conduct, especially those discovered by common law 
judges (Hayek 1973b:113, 1967b:100, 1967c:79, Leoni 1991 [1961], Kern 1956 [1914], McIlwain 
1947).12 That private law is discovered implies that law is not true because the judge has stated it, but 
the judge has stated it because it is true; thus, the true law is independent of any man's will or decree 
(Hayek 1976b:158, Kern 1956 [1914]). Government (public law), however, is statutory law concerning 
the administration of the resources placed at the government's disposal – including both the provision 
of public services as well as the practical enforcement of the private law (Hayek 1976b:159, 1967b:99, 
1966:168). While public law too must conform to the rule-of-law, the question of how to enforce the 
law is necessarily more discretionary and subjective than the principles of the law itself, and 
democratic political parties play their proper role in crafting government policy, not private law. To the 
extent that democracy and legal positivism are valid, they apply in the realm of public law, not private 
law. Thus, the original representative assembles were concerned with government (public law) – 
especially taxation – not (private) law. But this distinction has broken down, and the separation of 
powers has failed because sovereign democratic legislatures have come to be entrusted with both law 
and government (1976b:153f.; 1973b:112; 1967b:98, 101, 1967c:93ff., 1966:169; cf. McIlwain 1947).13 
On liberal principles, Hayek rejects the Hobbesian superstition that the sovereign must be 
unlimited, for the sovereign may be constrained by general principles of justice. Any legislation 
violating these principles may be declared unlawful (1976b:158, 1967b:98, 1967c:93). Unfortunately, 
Hayek says, the classical liberal writers rarely made their substantive conception of law explicit, but 
they merely tacitly assumed that “law” means general, universal rules (1973b:109, 1974b:138). 
Nevertheless, Hayek says, many of their arguments only make sense if we assume the rule-of-law is not 
merely procedural but substantive as well, constrained by general principles of justice. 
Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law may be understood as the necessary legal framework for 
ensuring that economic liberties are safeguarded so that individuals may make private decisions for 
themselves. Hayek's general, abstract, purpose-independent rules of just conduct imply a free-market 
economy with liberty of contract and association. Command-and-control regulation is generally 
inadmissible. Most regulations are are neither general nor purpose-independent because they require 
individuals to take specific actions in order to achieve specific outcomes. Only a market economy truly 
allows individuals to make decisions for themselves. 
Moreover, according to Hayek, rent-seeking and log-rolling are unfortunately endemic under 
unlimited legal positivist democracy (1976b:156; 1973b:107; 1973c:143; 1967b:100; 1967c:93, 96). 
Where the rule-of-law is merely procedural, the legislature is empowered to grant privileges to special 
interests. Moreover, when the legislature is able to grant special privileges, then it is impossible for any 
party to obtain a majority without promising such privileges. If the law were substantively limited to 
general, abstract, purpose-independent rules of just conduct, there would be little room for special 
interest legislation. Thus, while the procedural or formal aspects of Hayek's rule-of-law are taken for 
granted, the substantive aspects have startling and original implications.
Hayek's rule-of-law also implies that taxation should be a neutral as possible. Taxes should not 
politically reward and penalize specific behaviors, but instead, individuals should be free to make 
decisions according to the demands and desires of those with whom they trade and interact. When 
private individuals act, they should only have to take into account what willing and voluntary neighbors 
and partners ask of them, not what uninvolved third-parties – i.e. political officials – would like to see 
happen. In other words, discriminatory taxation is objectionable for the same reason as command-and-
control regulation. Mises (1981 [1922]:230; cf. ibid. 447) noted that discriminatory taxation can 
amount to de facto regulation, saying,
Directly or indirectly through its taxation policy, [the socialist state] determines the 
conditions of labour, moves capital and labour from one branch of industry to 
another . . . These tasks falling to the State are the only important ones and they 
constitute the essence of economic control.
Thus, we should rank different forms of taxation according to how discriminatory they are. Progressive 
income taxation is more discriminatory than flat income taxation, which is in turn more discriminatory 
than flat per-capita (head) taxation. Hayek rejected the progressive income tax precisely because it is 
discriminatory and violates the rule-of-law (1966:175, 1973c:142, 2011 [1960]:430-450). But none of 
these systems of taxation is as discriminatory as taxing specific activities and persons.
Furthermore, if the purpose of the rule-of-law is to enable individuals to make decisions for 
themselves, then it is crucial for individuals to be permitted to freely adjust their behavior to the tax 
regime. The state should not demand behaviors which run counter to the incentives created by the taxes 
– as if taxed products and activities are not taxed at all (cf. Mises (1981 [1922]:446). For example, 
suppose the state were to impose corporate taxes or artificially raise the costs of domestic labor and yet 
prohibit firms to relocate internationally, compelling them to remain where costs are higher. A 
command to behave as if taxation does not exist interferes with freedom and individual autonomy more 
than the taxation itself, and it entails more regulation which runs counter to the rule-of-law.
Remarkably, this interpretation Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law – including the chapter in 
the Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]:112-123) – squares perfectly with Hayek's writings on the problem 
of economic calculation, especially his famous essay, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (Hayek 
1945).14 According to Hayek, the price-system does not only allow individuals to coordinate their 
activities with each other, but it also enables every individual to bring his own unique knowledge to 
bear. As Hayek showed, it is the price-system which allows individuals to freely make decisions based 
on their own knowledge. Thus, Hayek's writings on the rule-of-law and the price-system turn out to 
share a common theme: both systems are essential to the individual's ability to plan his own life and 
make his own decisions for himself. Indeed, in a 1966 essay summarizing his philosophy, Hayek 
explicitly linked the two concepts, saying that “Liberalism . . . made it possible to to utilize the 
knowledge and skill of all members of society to a much greater extent than any order created by 
central direction.” (1966:162). This requires that “the coercive activities of government should be 
limited to the enforcement of such . . . universal rules of just conduct, protecting a recognizable private 
domain of individuals” (1966:162). Hayek distinguishes between a “spontaneous order based on 
abstract rules which leave individuals free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes, and an 
organization or arrangement based on commands” (1966:162). Hayek notes that “in contrast to an 
organization, neither has a spontaneous order a purpose nor need their be agreement on the concrete 
results it will produce” because a spontaneous order is “independent of any particular purpose” 
(1966:163).15 Such “purpose independent ('formal') rules of just conduct . . . did not impose obligations 
for particular actions . . . but consisted solely in prohibitions from infringing the protected domain of 
each . . . Liberalism is therefore inseparable from the institution of private property” (1966: 165).16 
Thus, Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law implies a market economy based on private property, 
where prices communicate the unique, local knowledge of every individual. Furthermore, the rule-of-
law so conceived implies that regulatory command-and-control will be eschewed in order that 
individuals are free to plan their own lives in accordance with the knowledge and data they subjectively 
perceive and apprehend.17 Remarkably then, Hayek's political and his economic works turn out to share 
a common theme; “The Use of Knowledge in Society” turns out to be arguing much the same point as 
the chapter on the rule-of-law in Road to Serfdom.18
This close relationship between the rule-of-law and the price-system recalls Röpke's distinction 
between “compatible” and “incompatible” interventions (1992 [1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.; cf. 
Jackson 2010:138):
we find that a differentiation between two groups of state intervention is of foremost 
importance, for which we have suggested the terms “compatible” and “incompatible” 
interventions: i.e. those that are in harmony with an economic structure based on the 
market, and those which are not. Interventions which do not interfere with the price 
mechanism and with the automatism of the market derived from it are compatible, they 
let themselves be absorbed as new “data”; interventions which paralyse the price 
mechanism and therefore force us to replace it by a planned (collectivist) order, we call 
incompatible. 
According to Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law and its relationship to the price-system and private 
property, we should expect Hayek – like Röpke – to generally favor interventions which are 
“compatible” with prices and to criticize “incompatible” ones (cf. Jackson 2010:139).19 Like the 
German ordoliberals, Hayek sought to furnish a “framework”, an “economic order” within which the 
competitive “economic process” could operate (Kolev 2010:10-16; cf. Hayek 1947). Hayek stated that 
his conception of the rule-of-law did allow for a minimum social safety net provided that it was 
“outside the market” (Hayek 1976a:87, 1973b:114, 1966:175, 1967c:92). The government could 
furnish public services provided that these services were for the benefit of all not and not merely 
sectional groups, that the government possessed no monopoly, and that it assessed taxes uniformly 
(non-progressively) (1973b:111, 1973c:144f., 1966:175). Thus, the rule-of-law has implications for 
discretionary public law as well. This seems to favor forms of welfare and social assistance which 
provide benefits with minimal administration so that they seamlessly integrate with the market. For 
example, Milton Friedman (1962) famously said that government could promote education through 
vouchers without actually operating any public schools. Similarly, for example, Hayek would probably 
consider it preferable to offer vouchers for healthcare to the poor, to be spent on unregulated private 
insurance, rather than to regulate private insurance. 
Hence, although the Road to Serfdom was written in response to full-blown command socialism 
(Caldwell 2007:30f, 2011; Godard 2013), if we wish to assess its contemporary relevance and 
applicability, it would be more helpful to take a more nuanced view of economic policies and systems, 
putting them on a continuum rather than dichotomous poles, assessing how compatible each is with the 
competitive market process. For example, it would be fruitless to debate whether Hayek would have 
supported public education or school vouchers if we insist on categorizing public education as 
“socialism” and vouchers as “mixed economy.” Instead, we should recognize that vouchers are more 
compatible with private property, non-discriminatory law, competition, and the price-system. Similarly, 
the multidimensional nature of the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index 
allows us to avoid sterile debates between socialism and the mixed economy.20 Rather than trying to 
pigeonhole actually existent economies into one category or the other, we may recognize that different 
interventions have different effects, affecting freedom and prices in different ways. All interventions – 
whether “socialist” or “mixed” – compromise freedom the autonomy of individual decision-making in 
similar yet different ways (Huerta de Soto 2010:83-87). Thus, without rigidly and awkwardly 
distinguishing between socialism and the mixed-economy, we may recognize that regulatory command-
and-control and discriminatory taxation are more damaging to freedom and the price-system than 
neutral taxation and general, abstract, purpose-independent law.
Therefore, in judging Hayek's response to a given regulation, tax, or intervention, we should 
assess the degree to which the intervention is compatible with the rule-of-law – i.e. whether it is 
general and neutral, or whether it is specific and discriminatory – and how much it constrains 
individual autonomy and decision-making. Indeed, Lawson and Clark (2010:235) note that
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis is confirmed most strongly when looking at the legal 
structure and property rights and the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic Freedom 
of the World] index. These two areas are more closely identified with political and civil 
liberties than the other areas of the EFW index (fiscal size of government, monetary 
policy, and trade policy).
Thus, Hayek's arguments were institutionally contingent: Hayek criticized a given system or policy 
insofar as it interfered with the price-system, including individuals' abilities to make decisions in the 
light of facts as they subjectively appeared to them. Socialism and the mixed-economy interfere with 
prices and individual decision-making in different ways and so they produce similar but different 
effects. Farrant and McPhail are completely right to criticize those who conflate Obamacare with 
Stalin's Five Year Plans and who condemn the Obama administration as equivalent to Hitler (F&M 
2010a, 2010b, 2012:95; M&F 2012:423f., 2013:967). But Farrant and McPhail (2010b) argue – 
wrongly, I claim – that Hayek himself would have agreed with those who ignorantly make the 
comparison. Farrant and McPhail claim that Hayek's claims in the Road to Serfdom must be wrong 
because the contemporary welfare state has not taken us down the road to serfdom. But a better 
explanation is that taxation and redistribution of income do not interfere with freedom and the price-
system the way discriminatory taxation and command-and-control do (Ikeda 2015:409, 414).
This interpretation of the Road to Serfdom as a defense of the price-system and a criticism of 
arbitrary command-and-control regulation robs Durbin (1945)'s criticism of much of its force. Durbin 
argues that the system of market socialism allows the government to direct the economy while 
preserving the role of prices and avoiding the problem of totalitarianism. In Durbin's words (1945:361, 
364),
There is no formal or logical contradiction between planning and pricing. It is perfectly 
possible for a centralised authority to order a price system to appear and to follow the 
guidance it necessarily gives. There is no necessary connection between the form of the 
authority by which decisions are taken and the principles according to which the 
decisions are made. . . . The theory of value and economic accountancy has been 
generalised to such a degree that it applies as much, or as little, to a centrally directed 
economic system as to any other.
For example, says Durbin, market socialism makes it unnecessary for the socialist state to “conscript 
the necessary number of works to man the industry and direct them to live in certain places and work 
for certain wages [and] to force them into obedience” (Durbin 1945:363). Of course, Mises (1981 
[1922]:119-123,192-194) and Hayek (1940, 1982) disputed the feasibility of market socialism, arguing 
that it embodied insoluble contradictions (cf. Leoni 2009 [1965], Lavoie 1985b, Steele 1992, Huerta de 
Soto 2010). But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Durbin is right. What Durbin does not 
realize is that he has conceded nearly the entire argument to Hayek. Hayek's claim is that without 
private property and market prices, freedom is impossible. Durbin's response is that the socialist 
government can perfectly simulate markets and prices. In other words, Durbin proposes that freedom 
can be maintained under socialism – contra Hayek – as long as socialism is nothing but an imitation of 
the very same regime which Hayek advocated. As Huerta de Soto (2010:174) notes, “socialist theorists 
were forced to withdraw to a weak second line of defense, one built on precisely the essential elements 
of that economic system they so hated and wished to destroy . . . In contrast, they now strive, with 
comic insistence, to justify socialism with the argument that it permits the preservation of the market.” 
W. H. Hutt (1975 [1954]:131) went so far as to say, “The so-called 'socialist economists' were clearly 
attempting to restore the market and the power of substitution. So much was this so, that I believed the 
result of their labours would ultimately be the re-building of laissez-faire institutions, in elaborate 
disguises of name and superficial form.” 
Moreover, while Durbin (1945:357) calls himself a “democratic socialist,” his system of market 
socialism actually has very little place for democracy. If the socialist government is to imitate the 
market and institute economic equilibrium, then it is mathematics, not the democratic will of the people 
which is authoritative. The system of market socialism has no place for democratic input or discretion 
(cf. Steele 1992: 157).21 Thus, Durbin's advocacy of market socialism undermines his own claim that, 
“We are politically free because we share in forming the laws” (1945:364). Durbin's criticisms of 
Hayek amount to a tacit admission that Hayek was right all along.
This interpretation of Hayek also turns the example of Sweden completely on its head. 
Samuelson and Sachs – cited by Farrant and McPhail (2009:5,9,11,12; 2010a:98, 107; 2010b:84; 
2012:101) – argue that if Hayek were correct, we may have expected Scandinavian socialism to have 
turned totalitarian by now. But if we understand Hayek to be criticizing regulatory command-and-
control and interference with the price-system, we see that this criticism misses the point entirely.22 The 
Scandinavian system relies more on taxation and redistribution than regulation or nationalization (Stein 
1991, Sanandaji 2011, Sumner 2015, Tupy 2016, Mitchell 2016, Iacono 2016). Scandinavian countries 
have historically offered a high degree of protection of private property and freedom to internationally 
trade. While Scandinavian countries tax at extremely high rates, they have also been engaging in 
widespread privatization and deregulation. Sweden even has a nationwide school voucher program. To 
a large degree, Scandinavian socialism has entailed giving some individuals an income subsidy and 
then allowing them free rein to spend this income in a free market. In many ways, Sweden is more pro-
market than the United States. This is not the socialism which Hayek criticized, as Hayek noted in 1976 
(2007 [1944]:54):
At the time I wrote, socialism meant unambiguously the nationalization of the means of 
production and the central economic planning which this made possible and necessary. 
In this sense Sweden, for instance, is today very much less socialistically organized than 
Great Britain or Austria, though Sweden is commonly regarded as much more 
socialistic.23
If anything, Scandinavian “socialism” has vindicated Hayek precisely it has generally eschewed 
command-and-control regulation; its relative success is built upon a maintenance of the price-system. 
This suggests that it is not safety nets which make robust markets viable – by protecting the least-well-
off from the vagaries of markets – but the opposite: it is robust markets which produce the wealth 
which makes safety nets affordable.24 This explains why Sweden can afford its welfare system while 
Greece and Venezuela cannot. Highly-regulated economies cannot absorb the costs of extensive welfare 
states. 
The Swedish model has much in common with the German ordo-liberal program of combining 
robust markets, prices, property, and competition with a minimum social safety net – instead of relying 
on quasi-socialist command-and-control regulation and nationalization. When we consider that the 
ordo-liberals in Germany were inspired by the Road to Serfdom (Godard 2013:378-382) and that Hayek 
was arguably an ordo-liberal himself (Kolev 2010), we realize that it is not merely mistaken to point to 
the Scandinavian model as refuting Hayek, but it is downright perverse. To the degree that the 
Scandinavian model has succeeded, it is precisely because it has relatively so much in common with 
what Hayek advocated. Sweden does not refute Hayek; it vindicates him.
III. CONCLUSION 
A variety of authors have either misinterpreted or under-appreciated Hayek's claims. For 
example, Lawson and Clark (2010:231) argue that Hayek chiefly placed value on formal political 
rights, not economic rights. Shleifer and Vishny (1994:168, 170) cite Hayek only to justify why he will 
not be discussed. Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail are highly critical of Hayek, arguing that 
according to Hayek himself, the Road to Serfdom applied not only to command planning but also to the 
contemporary welfare state or mixed economy as well. Because the welfare state has obviously not 
resulted in Soviet- or Nazi-style totalitarianism, Farrant and McPhail say, Hayek's arguments must be 
mistaken. Caldwell (2011, 1997:1866-1871) and Boettke and Snow (2012) reply that the Road to 
Serfdom must be understood in its specific historical and institutional context of command planning (cf. 
Godard 2013) and that it must not be confused with Hayek's later works, which are more relevant to the 
political situation today. All of these authors assume that we must sharply distinguish between 
socialism on the one hand and the mixed economy or welfare state on the other. Their argument 
reduces to a debate over how Hayek evaluated the members of this dichotomous set. But I have argued 
that it is better to understand Hayek as criticizing any intervention which interferes with private 
property and the functioning of the price-system (cf. Huerta de Soto 2010:83-87). Hayek's argument is 
an institutionally contingent one, and whether a given intervention will lead us down the road to 
serfdom depends how compatible a given intervention is with the functioning of the price-system. All 
interventions necessarily substitute political decision-making for individual autonomy. But the degree 
to which this is true varies depending on the nature of the intervention.25
According to Hayek, economic liberty is the fundamental liberty, and any intervention which 
compromises economic liberty, inhibits individuals' abilities to access and utilize the means for 
accomplish their diverse, individual ends. Hayek was less concerned with how the denial of economic 
liberty would eventually tend to compromise democratic suffrage. According to him, democracy 
possesses merely instrumental value, whereas economic liberty is valuable in itself. Hayek's conception 
of the rule-of-law implies a market system where prices communicate the unique, local information and 
knowledge of individuals  so that individuals are free to make decisions for themselves in light of the 
data as they subjectively appear to them. Hayek's philosophical defense of the rule-of-law dovetails 
with his economic analysis of socialist calculation. Furthermore, the Hayekian conception of the rule-
of-law entails that the law must not merely satisfy formal, procedural requirements – such as that the 
law must be well-known and impartially enforced – but furthermore, the law must satisfy substantive 
requirements as well, for an unjust law is no law at all. These substantive requirements largely 
correspond to the principles of economic liberty. This conception of the rule-of-law implies a criticism 
of command-and-control regulation as well as discriminatory taxation. Instead, Hayek would favor a 
market- and price-based system where taxation is neutral and laws serve only to prevent coercion and 
thus maximize economic liberty. Social welfare policies should be “outside the market,” or as Röpke 
said, “compatible” with the price-system. Farrant and McPhail claim that Hayek must be wrong 
because Scandinavian socialism has not turned totalitarianism, but my argument turns this claim on its 
head. Scandinavian “socialism” is characterized by a high degree of protection of private property and 
a low degree of regulation. Thus, the success of the Scandinavian system actually corroborates Hayek.
While I have not said everything there is to be said about Hayek, I hope to have demonstrated a 
few neglected points of interest. Even though the Road to Serfdom was written in response to full-
blown command socialism (Caldwell 2007:30f., 2011; Godard 2013), it embodies arguments which 
apply to other policies and systems as well (Boettke 1995). Hopefully, the debate over Hayek's legacy 
can now move constructively forward. Just as Hayek's revolutionary and progressive ideas inspired the 
postwar German miracle (Godard 2013:378-382), hopefully, they can inspire us today as well.
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